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Reading Between the Lines:
Charging Instruments at the ICTR
and the ICC
Claire Knittel*
Introduction
Black’s Law Dictionary defines “due process” as “the conduct of
legal proceedings according to established rules and principles for the
protection and enforcement of private rights, including notice and the
right to a fair hearing before a tribunal with the power to decide the
case.”1 This definition is admittedly an oversimplification of a complex
and deep category of law, but it is illuminating for what it does include.
The authors of the most authoritative legal dictionary in the United States
felt that three elements were so integral that they must be mentioned by
name in the limited space allowed: notice, a fair hearing, and jurisdiction.
These concerns are not limited to the domestic legal context of the
United States. All tribunals have an interest in ensuring their trials
comport with due process expectations—however those expectations
may be defined. Some may argue that extraordinary tribunals, such as
international criminal tribunals, are even more sensitive to these
concerns. As Judge Dolinc, sitting in the Trial Chamber for the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR or the “Tribunal”),
stated,
I strongly believe that the ultimate interest of
international justice, the universal application of the rule
of law, may be achieved only by respecting the basic
rights of an accused to a fair trial and due process. Even
when trying cases involving the most serious crimes, the

*J.D. Candidate 2012, Pace University School of Law Presidential Scholar. The
Author would like to thank Will Patterson and Amanda Grafstrom at the ICTR for their
help and guidance in writing this Article; Professor Alexander Greenawalt for his
comments and contributions; and her friends and family for their support.
1. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 228 (3d pocket ed. 2006).
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Tribunal is responsible for ensuring a fair trial.2
Notice requires that the accused is aware of the charges against him.
Many fear that without notice, an individual could be accused, unfairly
tried, and convicted without ever knowing what crime he committed. As
Edmond Dantés cries out “on what charges?” when he is arrested by the
gendarmes,3 and as Joseph K. in The Trial is taken away without
knowing his crime,4 so the rest of us fear trial and imprisonment without
ever knowing what we did wrong. Lack of notice in judicial proceedings
represents the state bringing its full power against an individual—a kind
of tyranny that the Framers of the United States Constitution reasonably
feared when they included the right to notice in the Sixth Amendment.5 It
is unsurprising that international tribunals are concerned about this
tyranny as well.
Determining what “notice” requires, however, is neither as
straightforward nor as widely agreed upon. Does the accused need to see
all the evidence against him in order for “notice” to be satisfied? How
soon before the proceedings should he know of the charges? Do notice
requirements extend throughout the trial, or do they exist only at the
beginning? Courts regularly wrestle with these questions and the
boundary between the rights of the accused and fairness, accuracy, and
the safety of evidence and witnesses. International criminal tribunals
struggle with the same issues in extraordinary circumstances: what does
“notice” mean when an individual is being tried sixteen years after
allegedly perpetrating one of the worst crimes society recognizes?
International criminal procedure, including the principle of notice,
has grown exponentially from the Nuremburg Trials conducted after
WWII, but the tribunals of today still face many sticky procedural issues.
This Article will focus on two problems that the ICTR and the
International Criminal Court (ICC), respectively, have faced with regard
to notice. Part I reviews the jurisprudence of the ICTR and ICC, focusing

2. Prosecutor v. Ntagerura, Bagambiki & Imanishimwe, Case No. ICTR-99-46-T,
Judgment and Sentence, ¶ 3 (Feb. 25, 2004) (opinion of Dolinc, J.).
3. THE COUNT OF MONTE CRISTO (Touchstone Pictures 2002). This exciting bit of
drama is in the film version of the story, rather than the original novel, but nevertheless
captures the injustice with which Dantés was treated. To stay true to the story it must be
noted that he was eventually told that he was denounced for treason by his first mate,
Danglars, but when he arrived at the Chateau D’If, he did not know his crime.
4. FRANZ KAFKA, THE TRIAL (David Wyllie trans., Dover Publ’ns 2009) (1925).
5. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
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particularly on requirements of notice and the requirements of the
charging instruments in each tribunal. Part II discusses in detail a
problem that each tribunal is facing: vagueness in the indictment at the
ICTR and informal changes to the charging instrument at the ICC. Part
III explores the shortcomings of partial solutions the tribunals have
adopted and possible future consequences of these solutions. I argue that
the ICTR has a troubling jurisprudential gap regarding the sufficiency of
the indictment and that this gap remains unaddressed by the Appeals
Chamber, which means that there is no standard for a proper pre-trial
indictment. I also argue that, while the ICC took a questionable
procedural shortcut in allowing informal changes to the charging
instrument, the practical effects of this shortcut may be less dire than
some have claimed.
I.
A.

Charging Instruments

Contextual Differences at the ICTR and ICC

Before going into the specifics of the charging instruments used at
the ICTR and the ICC, it is worth noting some contextual differences
between the two, both broadly and as related to the specific charging
procedure. It is unclear what the precise effects of these contextual
differences are (or will be) but they must therefore at least be noted.6
Broadly speaking, the ICTR and the ICC were created during two
very different times in history. The ICTR was created in response to the
genocide in Rwanda in 1994 and its jurisdiction covers only those
crimes.7 It is also relatively temporary—after all of the trials have been
completed the Tribunal will be dissolved and replaced by a “Residual
Mechanism,” which will take care of any remaining judicial duties and
maintenance of the ICTR’s archives.8 The ICTR is therefore limited to a
specific purpose. The ICC, on the other hand, was created as a standing

6. These introductory comments are meant to outline some of the relevant
contextual features; they are by no means exhaustive.
7. General Information, UNITED NATIONS INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR
RWANDA, http://www.unictr.org/AboutICTR/GeneralInformation/tabid/101/Default.aspx
(last visited Jan. 11, 2012).
8. Security Council Establishes Residual Mechanism to Conclude Tasks of
International Criminal Tribunals for Rwanda, Former Yugoslavia, UNITED NATIONS:
MEETING COVERAGE & PRESS RELEASES, Dec. 22, 2010, available at
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2010/sc10141.doc.htm.
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tribunal to try cases involving genocide, war crimes, or crimes against
humanity committed after 2002 (when the Rome Statute was ratified).9
Its mandate is therefore broader and permanent; the ICC is designed to
be a fixture in an international system of justice.
There has also been a broader societal shift towards protecting the
rights of the accused. As Gregory S. Gordon points out, “[f]rom the barebones privileges afforded defendants at the International Military
Tribunal at Nuremberg, to the more fleshed-out protections of the ad hoc
Yugoslavia and Rwanda tribunals, to the recent refinements of the
International Criminal Court, the rights of the accused in the
international criminal dock have most certainly expanded.”10 The
procedures at the ICC reflect many of these changes, while the
procedures at the ICTR (created roughly eight years earlier) reflect the
jurisprudential atmosphere at the time they were created. Subparts B and
C will go into these procedures in more detail.
B.

The ICTR: The Indictment

Article 20 of the Tribunal’s statute outlines the rights of the accused
at the ICTR. It covers rights such as the presumption of innocence,11
equality of all individuals,12 and the right to a fair and public hearing.13
Additionally, Article 20(4)(a) mandates that the accused must “be
informed promptly and in detail in a language which he or she
understands of the nature and cause of the charge against him or her.”14
Proceedings at the ICTR start when the prosecutor has conducted an
investigation and has gathered enough evidence such that a prima facie
case against the accused exists.15 When such a case exists, “the
Prosecutor shall prepare an indictment containing a concise statement of
the facts and the crime or crimes with which the accused is charged

9. Alicia Mazurek, Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo: The International
Criminal Court As It Brings Its First Case to Trial, 86 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 535, 538
(2009).
10. Gregory S. Gordon, Towards an International Criminal Procedure: Due
Process Aspirations and Limitations, 45 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 635, 638 (2007).
11. S.C. Res. 955, art. 20(3), U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov 6, 1994).
12. Id. art. 20(1).
13. Id. art. 20(2).
14. Id. art. 20(4)(a).
15. Id. art. 17(4).
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under the Statute.”16 The indictment is then transmitted to the Chamber,
where a judge reviews it to determine whether, in fact, a prima facie case
has been made.17 If so, the indictment will be confirmed and the
Chamber will arrest the individual or make any other preparations
necessary for a trial.18 If not, the indictment will simply be dismissed.19
This determination is conducted ex parte, giving the accused no
opportunity to respond to the charges. Once the accused appears before
the Tribunal, the indictment is read (thus starting the proceedings) and
the accused pleads guilty or not guilty.20 Only after this procedure can
the accused challenge the indictment.
An indictment can be changed by the prosecutor at three different
stages: before confirmation, after confirmation but prior to the initial
appearance of the accused, and after the initial appearance of the
accused. Before confirmation of the indictment by a judge, the
prosecutor can amend it at will, as many times as necessary.21 After
confirmation but prior to the initial appearance of the accused, the
prosecutor can only amend the indictment with leave of the judge who
confirmed it; acceptance of the new indictment is determined by the
same standards as the initial confirmation of the indictment.22 After the
initial appearance of the accused, the indictment can be amended only if
the Trial Chamber in charge of the case grants leave.23
An indictment is therefore the beginning of all proceedings and the
basis upon which a trial is grounded. It is the primary charging tool by
which the accused determines what crimes he is charged with and is
informed of a limited amount of the evidence against him. As such, it
fulfills two functions: the information function (giving the accused notice
of the charges against him); and the limiting function (restricting what
the accused can be charged with by requiring all charges to appear in the
indictment).24 An accused can only be convicted of crimes charged in the
16. Id.
17. Id. art. 18(1).
18. Id. art. 18(1)-(2).
19. Id. art. 18(1).
20. See id. art. 19(3).
21. ICTR Rules of Procedure and Evidence 50(A)(i) (June 29, 1995) ,
http://www.unictr.org/Portals/0/English%5CLegal%5CROP%5C100209.pdf.
22. Id. The President of the Tribunal may also appoint another judge to look over
the indictment.
23. Id.
24. Prosecutor v. Ntagerura, Bagambiki & Imanishimwe, Case No. ICTR-99-46-A,
Judgment, ¶ 2 (July 7, 2006) (Schomburg, J., dissenting).
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indictment,25 and the prosecutor cannot add charges during the trial as
new evidence is discovered.26 Consequently, the indictment restricts the
prosecutor and tells the accused what he is not charged with.27 The
specificity required of the indictment also changes depending on the
crime: crimes the accused personally perpetrated require details while
mass crimes do not.28 Therefore, the requirements of the indictment the
prosecutor must meet depend upon the crimes with which the accused is
charged. The indictment, therefore, is a very powerful tool: it is the locus
of the rights the accused is afforded during the trial and its precision or
lack thereof significantly shapes the proceedings.
C.

The ICC: Confirmation of the Charges

The rights of a charged individual at the ICC closely mimic the
guarantees provided to accused persons at the ICTR. Various articles
ensure rights such as the presence of the accused at trial,29 the
presumption of innocence,30 and a fair and impartial public hearing.31
Furthermore, as at the ICTR, accused individuals at the ICC are entitled
“[t]o be informed promptly and in detail of the nature, cause and content
of the charge, in a language which the accused fully understands and
speaks.”32
Proceedings at the ICC start with a confirmation of the charging
instrument. The Rome Statute requires that “the Pre-Trial Chamber []
hold a hearing to confirm the charges on which the Prosecutor intends to
seek trial.”33 At the ICTR a judge performs this task ex parte; at the ICC,
it is an adversarial proceeding—”[t]he hearing shall be held in the

25. Muvunyi v. Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-2000-55A-A, Judgment, ¶ 18 (Aug. 29,
2008).
26. Id. (“The Prosecution is expected to know its case before proceeding to trial and
cannot mould the case against the accused in the course of the trial depending on how the
evidence unfolds.”).
27. See id.
28. Compare Kamuhanda v. Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-99-54A-A, Judgment, ¶ 17
(Sept. 19, 2005) with Muvunyi v. Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-2000-55A-A, Judgment, ¶
58 (Aug. 29, 2008).
29. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 63, July 17, 1998, 2187
U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Rome Statute] (entered into force July 1, 2002).
30. Id. art. 66.
31. Id. art. 67.
32. Id. art. 67(1)(a).
33. Id. art. 61(1).
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presence of the Prosecutor and the person charged, as well as his or her
counsel.”34 The adversarial nature of the proceeding means that such
issues as disclosure, admissibility of evidence, and protection of
witnesses and victims come in to play before the charging instrument has
even been confirmed.
Rule 121(3) of the Rome Statute states that the prosecutor must
supply, to the person charged, a detailed description of the charges as
well as a list of all the evidence to be presented.35 This second
requirement goes far above and beyond the requirements at the ICTR: at
no point before the actual presentation of evidence during trial is an
accused afforded the privilege of seeing all evidence the prosecutor at the
ICTR has amassed. The mandate at the ICC goes both ways, however:
the person charged (not yet an “accused” or a “defendant”) is required to
disclose all evidence to the Pre-Trial Chamber and the prosecutor.36
During the hearing, the prosecutor must “support each charge with
sufficient evidence to establish substantial grounds to believe that the
person committed the crime charged.”37
As at the ICTR, there are procedures by which the prosecutor can
amend the charging instrument at the ICC. Before the hearing, the
prosecutor may amend the charges at will, provided that notice is given
to the charged individual.38 After the charging instrument has been
confirmed (but before the trial has started) the prosecutor can still amend
the charges, but he must do so with the permission of the court and
provide adequate notice to the accused.39 If, after the amendments, a new
charge has been added to the charging instrument, another hearing must
be held to confirm that new charge.40
After the hearing, the Pre-Trial Chamber has a few different paths it
can take regarding the charging instrument. The first path is to confirm
the charges, by finding the evidence sufficient and committing the person

34. Id. art 61. Provision (2) allows for a situation where the person charged has
waived his right to presence or has fled and cannot be found. In those situations, the
proceeding can be conducted ex parte. Id. art. 61(2).
35. Finalized Draft Text of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Preparatory
Comm’n for the Int’l Criminal Court, 13-31 Mar., 12-30 June, 2000, U.N. Doc.
PCNICC/2000/1/Add.1 (Nov. 2, 2000) [hereinafter ICC RPE].
36. Id. r. 121(6).
37. Rome Statute, supra note 29, art. 61(5).
38. Id. art. 61(4).
39. ICC RPE, supra note 35, r. 128; id. art. 61(9) .
40. Rome Statute, supra note 29, art. 61(9).
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to stand trial; the second is to not confirm the charges where there is not
sufficient evidence.41 The third path is somewhat unique: the Pre-Trial
Chamber may adjourn the hearing so that the prosecutor can either a)
present more evidence or do further investigations to discover more
evidence; or b) amend the charge(s) because the evidence submitted
during the hearing “appears to establish a different crime within the
jurisdiction of the Court.”42
As at the ICTR, the confirmation of charges hearing at the ICC is
the beginning of proceedings against the charged individual. While the
confirmation hearing is not intended to be a “mini trial,” the adversarial
nature of the hearing and the resulting rules of evidence and procedure
make it more, rather than less, like a trial.43 Additionally, the Pre-Trial
Chamber has used this procedural step to render lengthy and detailed
opinions regarding confirmation. The Lubanga Decision on the
Confirmation of the Charges runs 157 pages;44 the Katanga and Chui
Decision runs 226 pages;45 and the Bemba Decision runs 186 pages.46 In
these opinions the Pre-Trial Chamber provides factual background and
discusses preliminary evidentiary steps and procedural matters before
touching on the elements of the crime.47 Thus, while the confirmation of
charges hearing is statutorily limited to the issue of confirmation, the
Pre-Trial Chamber has nonetheless seized the opportunity to begin
clarifying the application of the statute and rules to practical situations.

41. Id. art. 61(7)(a)-(b).
42. Id. art. 61(7)(c).
43. See Mazurek, supra note 9, at 540.
44. Prosecutor v. Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Decision on the
Confirmation of Charges (Jan. 29, 2007).
45. Prosecutor v. Katanga & Ngudjolo Chui, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07, Decision
on Confirmation of Charges (Sept. 30, 2008).
46. Prosecutor v. Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08, Decision Pursuant to Article
61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute on the Charges of the Prosecutor Against JeanPierre Bemba Gombo (June 15, 2009).
47. Prosecutor v. Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Decision on the
Confirmation of Charges (Jan. 29, 2007).
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Gaps at the ICTR and the ICC

At the ICTR: Vagueness in the Indictments
1. Defective Indictments

An indictment is defective when it does not fulfill its primary
purpose of putting the accused on notice of the charges against him.48 By
failing to give notice, the indictment creates prejudice against the
accused and materially impairs his ability to defend his case, thus
violating his rights.49 This defect most commonly occurs in a vague
indictment that lacks the necessary specifics (such as date, place, names,
or even the actual crime) to inform the accused of the charges he is
facing.
Vagueness can lead to a defect in either the information or the
limitation function of the indictment. If there is a defect in the
information function, then there is not enough information for the
accused to properly build a defense. For example, the charge against the
accused may be so vague that the accused cannot gather evidence or find
witnesses to support his defense, because he does not know enough
information about the date, time, and location of the alleged crime. If
there is a defect in the limitation function, then there is not sufficient
specificity to ensure the trial sticks to the charges in the indictment. For
example, the prosecutor may exploit any vagueness in the indictment by
attempting to slip extra charges into the grey areas. If the charges are so
vague that they are “capable of misleading the accused as to the nature of
the criminal conduct with which he is charged,” then the prosecutor may
try to take advantage of that ambiguity.50 The consequence is that by the
end of the trial, the accused is charged with crimes for which he has not
been put on notice and against which he has not and cannot defend
himself. A vague indictment often fails in both functions. There is a
balance, however, between the requirements of notice and what is
reasonable to demand of the prosecutor: lack of specificity does not

48. See Nahimana, Barayagwiza & Ngeze v. Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-99-52-A,
Judgment, ¶ 322 (Nov. 28, 2007).
49. Prosecutor v. Ntagerura, Bagambiki & Imanishimwe, Case No. ICTR-99-46-A,
Judgment, ¶ 28 (July 7, 2006).
50. Prosecutor v. Ntakirutimana & Ntakirutimana, Case Nos. ICTR-96-10-A &
ICTR-96-17-A, Judgment, ¶ 471 (Dec. 13, 2004).
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automatically result in a defective indictment, 51 and the indictment does
not need to be so specific that it pleads the evidence.52

2. Challenging a Defective Indictment
An accused can challenge the indictment before, during, and after
the trial. Current jurisprudence shows that during trial the court has a
variety of options to respond to such a challenge. The Trial Chamber can
order the prosecutor to amend the indictment, can rule that the prosecutor
has “cured” the defect by providing supplementary information, or can
exclude evidence relating to the vague charge.53 If the indictment is
challenged after the trial is completed but before the Trial Chamber has
reached a verdict, then the Chamber may exclude evidence from its
considerations or determine that the indictment was cured. After the
accused has been convicted, the Appeals Chamber on appeal can
consider whether the indictment was cured.
a. During Trial
The first option that the Trial Chamber may consider in response to
a challenge to the indictment is to order an amendment to the indictment,
to provide the necessary information, and fix the ambiguity. This
response is illustrated in Prosecutor v. Nchamihigo. Shortly after the start
of the trial, Nchamihigo challenged the indictment as deficient because
the prosecutor had not complied with an earlier order to include more
specific information.54 Nchamihigo argued that “the non-compliance
violate[d] the rights of the [a]ccused to know the charges against him and
prepare his defence [sic],” and requested that the prosecutor either follow
the directions given by the Trial Chamber or strike the offending

51. Prosecutor v. Seromba, Case No. ICTR-2001-66-A, Judgment, ¶ 27 (Mar. 12,
2008).
52. Prosecutor v. Ndindabahizi, Case No. ICTR-2001-71-I, Judgment and Sentence,
¶ 28 (July 15, 2004) (“[T]he indictment need not achieve the impossible standard of
reciting all aspects of the evidence against the accused as it will unfold at trial.”).
53. Niyitegeka v. Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-96-14-A, Judgment, ¶ 196 (July 9,
2004).
54. Prosecutor v. Nchamihigo, Case No. ICTR-2001-63-T, Decision on Defense
Motion for Non-Conformity of the Indictment with the Trial Chamber’s Decision on
Defects in the Form of the Indictment, ¶ 1 (Dec. 7, 2006).
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paragraphs.55 The Trial Chamber determined that, while the prosecutor
had provided more details in other supplementary materials, it had not
included these details in the indictment itself, and should have.56 The
Chamber therefore ordered the prosecutor to file a new amended
indictment with the necessary changes and specifications.57
There are many motions with similar rulings scattered throughout
the ICTR jurisprudence. However, there have also been many motions
for more specificity in the indictment that the Trial Chamber has not
granted. For example, in Prosecutor v. Karemera, Karemera challenged
multiple paragraphs in the indictment and claimed lack of specificity.58
The Trial Chamber stated that the prosecutor must strike a balance
between adequate notice and brevity and, after pointing out that the
Chamber “has discretion in assessing such balance,” rejected Karemera’s
motion.59 It found that the indictment, when read as a whole, gave
adequate notice considering the crimes that were charged and the level of
specificity already present.60
Curing, the second option, allows the prosecutor to use materials
outside of the indictment to “fix” ambiguity. To cure, the prosecutor has
to give the accused “timely, clear, and consistent information detailing
the factual basis underpinning the charge.”61 Since “the [i]ndictment is
not to be seen in isolation,”62 this timely, clear, and consistent
information is provided in supplementary materials, such as the Pre-Trial
brief, opening statements and, in special instances, witness summaries.63
The Appeals Chamber justifies curing (which, practically speaking, is
acknowledging that the prosecutor did not provide enough information in
the beginning and yet allowing it) by using the accused’s right to build
an adequate defense as the standard:

55. Id.
56. Id. ¶¶ 4, 7, 10.
57. Id. ¶ 11.
58. Prosecutor v. Karemera, Ngirumpatse, Nzirorera & Rwamakuba, Case No.
ICTR-98-44-T, Decision on the Accused Karemera’s Preliminary Motion Alleging
Defects in Form of the Amended Indictment, ¶ 9 (Apr. 23, 2004).
59. Id. ¶ 16.
60. Id. ¶ 17-19.
61. Muvunyi v. Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-2000-55A-A, Judgment, ¶¶ 20, 120
(Aug. 29, 2008).
62. Muhimana v. Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-95-1B-A, Judgment, ¶ 5 (May 21,
2007) (Schomburg, J., dissenting).
63. Prosecutor v. Mpambara, Case No. ICTR-01-65-T, Judgment, ¶ 165 (Sept. 11,
2006).
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The question of delayed disclosure is irrelevant as long
as the accused is able to defend himself against all the
allegations. As the right to be informed cannot be
viewed in isolation and must be seen in the context of
the right to prepare a defence [sic], the decisive factor in
determining whether the accused’s rights were in fact
impaired has to be whether he was able to frame his
defence [sic] accordingly.64
Curing is, however, the exception and not the rule. The prosecutor
cannot substantially rely on it to provide notice during the trial and it
“should be limited to exceptional cases.”65 The limit is logical: while
some flexibility would best serve the interests of justice, the Tribunal is
not interested in allowing the prosecutor to start a trial with only a
skeleton case against the accused that it fills in as the trial progresses.
Curing is not permitted to add counts66 or radically change the
indictment;67 outside information can therefore only supplement the
indictment to cure lack of specificity.
The third option, excluding evidence, does not involve changing the
indictment itself but instead addresses the evidentiary consequences of
vagueness. In order for evidence of a crime to be accepted by the
Tribunal, the crime must be included in the indictment.68 If the crime is
not in the indictment because the indictment is vague, then no evidence
should be allowed in to prove it. If evidence is submitted and accepted by
the Trial Chamber anyway, then the Chamber has violated the rights of
the accused because the accused can only be convicted of crimes charged
in the indictment. Determining whether evidence should be excluded
therefore pivots on whether the charge was sufficiently pled in the
charging instrument. The prosecutor will argue that the evidence relates

64. Muhimana v. Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-95-1B-A, Judgment, ¶ 15 (May 21,
2007).
65. Prosecutor v. Ntagerura, Bagambiki & Imanishimwe, Case No. ICTR-99-46-A,
Judgment, ¶ 114 (July 7, 2006).
66. Muvunyi v. Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-2000-55A-A, Judgment, ¶ 156 (Aug.
29, 2008).
67. Id. ¶ 20.
68. See Prosecutor v. Bagosora, Kabiligi, Ntabakuze & Nsengiyumva, Case No.
ICTR-98-41-T, Decision on Ntabakuze Motion for Exclusion of Evidence, ¶ 2 (June 29,
2006).
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to a charge that was technically included in the indictment and should
therefore be allowed in, while the accused will argue that the evidence
relates to a vaguely pleaded charge, and therefore should be kept out.69
The determination becomes whether the indictment has been cured, as
discussed above, such that notice was provided.70
These second and third options are often intertwined: if a challenge
arises during trial it usually is triggered by the admission of evidence,
and the question becomes whether to allow the evidence in and whether
it proves something pled in the indictment. One motion in Prosecutor v.
Nsengiyumva provides a good example of the intersection between these
two remedies for the Tribunal. In that motion, Ntabakuze challenged the
inclusion of evidence based on its relevance.71 In its decision, the Trial
Chamber set out the relevant law as follows:
Where a material fact cannot be reasonably related to the
Indictment, then it shall be excluded. Where the material
fact is relevant only to a vague or general allegation in
the Indictment, then the Chamber will consider whether
notice of the material fact was given in the Pre-Trial
Brief or the opening statement, so as to cure the
vagueness of the Indictment. Notice of a material fact
anywhere in the Pre-Trial Brief would inform the
Defence [sic] of the need to address and investigate the
allegation, regardless of the specific witness who is said
to be the source of the information.72
In other words, if the evidence is probative but connected to nothing
in the indictment, the Trial Chamber cannot consider it because it was
not properly pled and notice was not given to the accused. If the evidence
is probative but there is ambiguity or vagueness concerning the
indictment, then the Trial Chamber will look at supplementary materials
to evaluate whether the prosecutor has provided notice to the accused (in
other words, curing). As outlined above, some supplementary materials

69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Prosecutor v. Bagosora, Kabiligi, Ntabakuze & Nsengiyumva, Case No. ICTR98-41-T, Decision on Nsengiyumva Motion for Exclusion of Evidence Outside the Scope
of the Indictment, ¶ 1 (Sept. 15, 2006).
72. Id. ¶ 9.
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provide notice while others do not. The Trial Chamber in Nsengiyumva
found that the Pre-Trial brief, opening statement, Supporting Material (a
specific document disclosed by the prosecutor), and witness statements
provided adequate notice for some grounds, but not for others, and
therefore partially granted the motion for exclusion.73 For each allegation
the Trial Chamber examined the relevant documents, examined the
testimony that was actually provided, and determined whether there was
a sufficient match between the two to allow admissibility.
For example, the defense argued that the prosecutor failed to plead
command responsibility of the accused over the Interahamwe for a
particular event, pointing out that the prosecutor only used the word
“troops.”74 The Trial Chamber found that the prosecutor, in other areas of
the indictment as well as in the Supporting Material and Pre-Trial Brief,
used the word Interahamwe and provided details supporting its
allegation.75 Thus, while the indictment may not have explicitly said
“Ntabakuze exercised command responsibility over the Interahamwe on
this particular date,” there was sufficient notice. The Trial Chamber
concluded that the whole of the indictment didn’t allow ambiguity such
that “the Defence [sic] would have been prejudiced in its investigations
or . . . would have misapprehended the nature of the material facts
alleged against the Accused.”76 Thus, the evidence was allowed in.
In the instances where the evidence was not allowed in, the Trial
Chamber’s determination was similarly straightforward: if no mention of
the underlying crime or facts were mentioned in any of the charging
documents or supporting materials, then the evidence was excluded.77 As
an illustration, in Nsengiyumva the defense challenged evidence relating
to various meetings during which the accused allegedly planned to
exterminate Tutsis; after an examination of the indictment the Trial
Chamber found no supporting allegations.78 It held that “[a]lthough the
[i]ndictment does make general allegations . . . there is no allegation
resembling this meeting or this particular type of conduct.”79
Additionally, there was no supplementary evidence “which would cure

73. Id. ¶¶ 21 (pre-trial brief), 16 (opening statement), 18 (supporting material), and
11 (witness statements).
74. Id ¶ 19.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. See, e.g., id. ¶¶ 42, 44-45, 69.
78. Id. ¶ 42.
79. Id.
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the vagueness of the [i]ndictment.”80 As a result, the evidence was
excluded.
b. After Trial
After the trial has been completed, the Chamber may decide
whether or not to consider evidence. If the underlying charge was not
sufficiently pled then the evidence must be excluded for the same
reasons as above; if the indictment was cured, such that proper notice
was given, then the evidence may be admitted.
Prosecutor v. Niyitegeka provides an illustrative example of these
two options. There, the Trial Chamber addressed the issue of notice for
each allegation in the indictment separately.81 Its determination of
whether the accused was properly on notice incorporated all the elements
of the jurisprudence outlined above: whether notice was given in the
indictment, whether it was given by supplementary materials, whether it
was given early enough to allow the accused to mount a proper defense,
etc. The analysis had to be allegation-specific because the amount of
detail required for an allegation changed depending on what crime was
charged.
There were a number of different areas where the Trial Chamber
found that the accused was put on notice. In one, concerning a particular
attack in the later half of April, the defense complained that it was
notified late of the allegation.82 The Trial Chamber allowed that “this
event is not mentioned in the Indictment, the Pre-trial Brief, or the
witness’s statement dated 31 January 1996,” but ultimately concluded
that the accused was put on notice by a memorandum submitted before
trial.83 Thus, “[t]he Chamber consider[ed] that this cure[d] the lack of
notice in the Indictment.”84 The defense made a similar argument
concerning another attack around the same time in April and the Trial
Chamber considered the same factors. It determined that
[a]lthough this allegation is not mentioned in the

80. Id.
81. Prosecutor v. Niyitegeka, Case No. ICTR-96-14-T, Judgment and Sentence
(May 16, 2003).
82. Id. ¶¶ 84-87.
83. Id. ¶ 87.
84. Id.
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Indictment nor in the witness’s prior statements, the
Chamber notes that the 13 May attack is mentioned as
being Witness GGY’s anticipated testimony in the
Prosecutor’s Pre-trial Brief filed on 11 March 2002,
about 3 months before the commencement of trial and 5
months before the witness’s testimony. The Chamber
considers that this constitutes sufficient notice to the
Defence [sic].85
There were other allegations, however, that the Chamber did not
find cured, and it therefore excluded the evidence relating to those
allegations. For example, concerning an attack in June, one witness
testified that he saw the accused personally club a child.86 Without a
specific protest by Niyitegeka, the Trial Chamber determined that he had
not been given notice. It held that the alleged murder was not in the
Indictment, Pre-Trial Brief, or witnesses’ statements, and this lack of
notice was fatal to the prosecutor’s ability to use the evidence.87 Since
murder must be specifically pled in the indictment88 and no
supplementary materials were disclosed to provide notice, “the Defence
[sic] had little or no notice of this alleged act of killing. Consequently . . .
the Chamber will disregard this evidence.”89
The seriousness of adequate notice to the accused—and the Trial
Chamber’s commitment to this requirement—is seen most clearly when
the Trial Chamber decides to exclude evidence after the trial is
completed. During trial, the prosecutor can respond to an exclusion of
evidence by trying to support the allegations in some other way. At the
end of trial, however, there are no other options left. If, in the above
situation, the witness is telling the truth and the accused did beat a child
to death on that day, then the prosecutor has forfeited her ability to hold
the accused responsible due to a procedural error—failure to adequately
plead the charge in the indictment. There may be legitimate reasons that
the charge was not included in the indictment: the witness may have been
too scared to speak about what he saw, or he may have forgotten some
85. Id. ¶ 147.
86. Id. ¶ 288.
87. Id. ¶ 289.
88. Kamuhanda v. Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-99-54A-A, Judgment, ¶ 17 (Sept.
19, 2005).
89. Prosecutor v. Niyitegeka, Case No. ICTR-96-14-T, Judgment and Sentence, ¶
289 (May 16, 2003).
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details over sixteen years and remembered them later. Yet notice is
integral for a fair trial: if the accused were convicted of a crime for which
there was no notice, there is a possibility that a) he did not actually
commit the crime; b) the resulting judgment would be viewed as
fundamentally unfair and reputation of the Tribunal would suffer; and/or
c) the lack of notice would create an automatic appeals point, which
could overturn the judgment and waste judicial resources. Thus, while
exclusion of evidence may seem harsh, it is a procedurally sound remedy
for vagueness.
c. On Appeal
When a party appeals a decision90 the Appeals Chamber will review
the conviction for either “an error on a question of law invalidating the
decision or . . . an error of fact which has occasioned a miscarriage of
justice.”91 The Appeals Chamber therefore has a limited function in
addressing challenges to the indictment: it will determine whether the
indictment was cured and whether the trial produced a fair outcome. 92 A
challenge to the indictment may be only one of many grounds for appeal.
The appeals judgment in Prosecutor v. Ntagerura, Bagambiki, and
Imanishimwe provides an example of how the Appeals Chamber treats
the issue. There, one challenge that Imanishimwe brought against his
conviction asserted that he had been convicted for charges that were not
properly pled in the indictment.93 This challenge goes to the heart of the
indictment jurisprudence: in order to ensure a fair trial the accused must
have notice of the crimes for which he is being held responsible; if that
notice is not given, the final outcome lacks credibility. Imanishimwe
argued that the indictment “did not in any way inform him of the nature
of the charges against him . . . since . . . [it did] not specify the actual
perpetrators, the date and place of the alleged massacre, or the nature of

90. Mark A. Drumbl & Kenneth S. Gallant, Appeals in the Ad Hoc International
Criminal Tribunals: Structure, Procedure, and Recent Cases, 3 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS
589, 607 (2001) (internal quotation marks omitted). Either the defense or the prosecutor
may appeal a final judgment at the ICTR. Id. at 610.
91. Id. at 618.
92. See Niyitegeka v. Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-96-14-A, Judgment, ¶ 196 (July
9, 2004).
93. Prosecutor v. Ntagerura, Bagambiki & Imanishimwe, Case No. ICTR-99-46-A,
Judgment, ¶ 115 (July 7, 2006).
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his alleged participation therein or that of his subordinates.”94 The
prosecutor and the Trial Chamber agreed that the Indictment was
impermissibly vague,95 but the prosecutor argued that it had cured the
defect by providing sufficient supplemental material to put Imanishimwe
on notice.96 The Trial Chamber considered evidence relating to the
charges, and returned a conviction.97
The Appeals Chamber’s analysis started with the question of
whether an indictment could be cured and, after answering in the
affirmative, whether it had in fact been cured.98 It found that
Imanishimwe was not on notice regarding a particular set of events
because they had not been plead in the indictment and were not included
in any supplementary materials.99 Since he was not given timely notice
of the allegations100 “Imanishimwe’s ability to prepare his defence [sic]
in relation to the Gashirabwoba events was materially impaired,” which
rendered the proceedings unfair.101 As a result, the Trial Chamber was
incorrect in returning a verdict against him for his alleged participation in
the events, and the Appeals Chamber reversed that part of the guilty
verdict.102
B.

At the ICC: Changing the Charges
1. The Confirmation Hearing of Lubanga

There are a limited number of confirmation hearings that have
occurred at the ICC, and consequently the jurisprudence that discusses
this stage of the proceedings is much more limited than the jurisprudence
at the ICTR concerning vague indictments. This Paper will focus

94. Id. ¶ 116
95. Id. ¶¶ 117, 120.
96. Id. ¶ 132 (“The Prosecution submits that Imanishimwe was supplied with
information pertaining to Gashirabwoba on 26 November 1999 through disclosure of the
redacted statements of Witnesses LAC, LAB and LAH . . . . [and] in paragraphs 2.29 to
2.40 and in Annexes 3 and 5 of its Pre-Trial Brief, which was filed two and a half months
prior to the start of trial.”).
97. Id. ¶ 134.
98. Id. ¶ 136.
99. Id. ¶¶ 141.
100. Id. ¶¶ 155-56.
101. Id. ¶ 164.
102. Id. ¶ 164-65.
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specifically on the first confirmation of charges at the ICC, against
Thomas Lubanga Dyilo (“Lubanga”). Lubanga was charged under
Articles 8(2)(e)(vii) and 25(3)(a) of the Rome Statute for conscripting
and enlisting children under fifteen to participate in hostilities, not of an
international character, in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).103
Lubanga allegedly entered politics in 1999, when he was first elected to
the Ituri District Assembly, and then was integral in the creation of the
Union des Patriots Congolais (UPC) and the corresponding military
wing, Forces Patriotiques pour la Liberation du Congo (FPLC).104
Lubanga became the Commander-in-Chief of the FPLC in early
September 2002.105
2. Informal Amendments to the Charging Instrument
The purpose of the charging instrument, as with an indictment, is to
inform the charged individual about the crimes the prosecutor believes he
committed. If the charging instrument does not do this, then the Rome
Statute allows for the instrument to be amended. The procedure,
described in Part 1, infra, explicitly allows for the prosecutor to amend
the indictment and bring it back to the Pre-Trial Chamber.
This situation arose at Lubanga’s confirmation hearing.106 The
charging instrument that the prosecutor brought against Lubanga alleged
that the crimes “occurred in the context of an armed conflict not of an
international character,” per Article 8(2)(e)(vii).107 Article 8(2)(e)(vii)
criminalizes “[c]onscripting or enlisting children under the age of fifteen
years into armed forces or groups or using them to participate actively in
hostilities,” when the hostilities are not part of an international

103. Prosecutor v. Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Document
Containing the Charges, Article 63(3)(a) (Aug. 28, 2006).
104. Prosecutor v. Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Decision on the
Confirmation of Charges, ¶¶ 6-8 (Jan. 29, 2007).
105. Id.
106. This difficulty has arisen only once in the confirmation of charges against
Lubanga. As of the writing of this Article only two other trials have started at the ICC
and neither have dealt with the same issue. See Prosecutor v. Katanga & Ngudjolo Chui,
Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07, Decision on Confirmation of Charges (Sept. 30, 2008);
Prosecutor v. Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08, Decision Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a)
and (b) of the Rome Statute on the Charges of the Prosecutor Against Jean-Pierre Bemba
Gombo (June 15, 2009).
107. Prosecutor v. Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Document
Containing the Charges, Article 63(3)(a), ¶ 7 (Aug. 28, 2006).
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conflict.108 After evidence was presented during the hearing, however,
the Pre-Trial Chamber decided that the conflict was better characterized
as an “armed conflict” that was international, thus criminalizing
Lubanga’s conduct under Article 8(2)(b)(xxvi).109 Article 8(2)(b)(xxvi)
criminalizes “[c]onscripting or enlisting children under the age of fifteen
years into the national armed forces or using them to participate actively
in hostilities” that are international.110 The Pre-Trial Chamber drew this
conclusion based on arguments made by the prosecutor, Lubanga’s
attorney, and counsel for the victims.111 It found that both Rwanda and
Uganda were involved in the violence in the DRC in the relevant area
and during the relevant time, making it an “international” conflict.112
Since the character of the conflict was international, the Pre-Trial
Chamber decided that the evidence more clearly fit under Article
8(2)(b)(xxvi), rather than the article that the prosecutor originally
charged—Article 8(2)(e)(vii).
Per Article 61(7)(c)(ii), when this situation arises, the Pre-Trial
Chamber must adjourn the proceedings and give the prosecutor a chance
to amend the charging instrument so that the charges reflect the evidence.
Here, the Pre-Trial Chamber should have adjourned the proceedings,
allowed the prosecutor to amend the charging instrument to reflect
charges under Article 8(2)(b)(xxvi) (or both articles), and then brought
that charging instrument back to the confirmation hearing to give
Lubanga a chance to challenge the amended charges. As the Pre-Trial
Chamber pointed out, this procedure is to “prevent the Chamber from
committing a person for trial for crimes which would be materially
different from those set out in the Document Containing the Charges and
for which the Defence [sic] would not have had the opportunity to submit
observations at the confirmation hearing.”113 In other words, a charging
instrument with crimes that do not match the evidence would deprive the
charged individual of notice, the lack of which would prevent him from
giving a proper defense. Here, Lubanga would have been formally
charged under Article 8(2)(e)(vii) but would have been actually facing

108. Rome Statute, supra note 29, art. 8(2)(e)(vii).
109. Prosecutor v. Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Decision on the
Confirmation of Charges, ¶ 220 (Jan. 29, 2007).
110. Rome Statute, supra note 29, art. 8(2)(b)(xxvi).
111. Prosecutor v. Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Decision on the
Confirmation of Charges, ¶ 200 (Jan. 29, 2007)..
112. Id.
113. Id. ¶ 203.
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charges under Article 8(2)(b)(xxvi). This mismatch, according to the
Rome Statute, would deprive Lubanga of his right to notice.
At the Lubanga confirmation hearing, however, the Chamber did
not adjourn the proceedings so that the prosecutor could amend the
charging instrument. Rather, the Chamber found that the two charges
“criminalise[d] the same conduct” and, as a result, decided that “it [wa]s
not necessary to adjourn the hearing and request the Prosecutor to amend
the charges.”114 The Pre-Trial Chamber outlined the elements for each
crime and noted the elements in common: namely, enlistment or
conscription of children under fifteen years old to actively participate in
hostilities, knowledge by the perpetrator that the children were under
fifteen, and knowledge by the perpetrator that the conflict existed.115 The
Pre-Trial Chamber noted that there were two areas in which the crimes
were not the same: first, clearly, in the difference between an
international and a non-international armed conflict; and second, in the
difference between “national armed forces” and “an armed force or
group.”116 The Chamber, through interpretation of other treaties and
preparatory materials, interpreted “national armed forces” to mean “not
limited to the armed forces of a State.”117 Consequently, Lubanga’s
actions (supported by enough evidence to provide substantial grounds to
believe Lubanga committed these actions) were criminalized equally
under both articles. Since the Pre-Trial Chamber found no material
differences between the conduct that each section of the statute
criminalized, it believed that an adjournment was not necessary to amend
the charging instrument.118 It did not follow the procedure outlined in the
Rome Statute and instead confirmed the charging instrument as it was
written.

114. Id. ¶ 204.
115. Id. ¶ 240.
116. Id.; see also Rome Statute, supra note 29, art. 8(2)(e)(vii) (referring to noninternational conflicts), art. 8(2)(b)(xxvi) (referring to international conflicts).
117. Id. ¶ 285.
118. See Olympia Bekou, Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo—Decision on the
Confirmation of Charges, 8 Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 343, 345 (2008).
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III. The Bridge to Nowhere
A.

The ICTR: When will it get solved?

As shown above, there is a gap in the jurisprudence of the ICTR
regarding the sufficiency of the indictment before the proceedings start.
The Appeals Chamber has clearly outlined the law addressing challenges
during and post-trial, and has fashioned remedies to make the best of a
bad situation: in these instances the trial has started, evidence has been
submitted, and then it becomes clear that the charging instrument is not
fulfilling its functions. In this setting, the jurisprudence must bridge any
divide between what the indictment is and what it should be, and
remedies like exclusion of evidence or curing are created to make the
best of a flawed scenario. These solutions, however, do not comment on
what a sufficient indictment looks like. This gap is troubling because the
Trial Chambers at the ICTR and Appeals Chamber have had numerous
occasions to determine whether an indictment is defective and whether
the accused was afforded a fair trial. One could even make the
generalization that each case that has appeared before the Tribunal
includes challenges to the indictment, in one form or another. Despite
this wealth of opportunities, however, there is no Appeals Chamber
determination regarding sufficiency of an indictment when raised during
a pre-trial motion.
What caused this gap? As with all courts, judges have some
discretion to raise issues but mostly respond to arguments brought by the
attorneys. Therefore, in order for the adequacy of the indictment to be
treated by the Appeals Chamber before the trial has started, a variety of
factors are required to align.119 First, there must be a vague indictment.
Second, the accused’s counsel must challenge the indictment, which
means counsel must raise the motion at the right time, must challenge the
right parts, and must, of course, have a good argument. This second
factor is dependent upon the circumstances of the case because, as shown
above, the level of specificity required in indictments depends on the
crimes charged. Third, the judge must agree that the indictment is vague
and order it amended. Fourth, the prosecutor must fail or refuse to fix the
indictment; if the indictment is fixed, or an amended indictment is filed,
then the issue becomes moot. Fifth, the defense must challenge the
119. E-mail from Amanda Grafstrom, Assoc. Legal Officer, ICTR, to Author (Jan.
6, 2011, 09:44 EST) (on file with Author).
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indictment again claiming that it was not fixed or is still insufficiently
vague. Sixth, after the Trial Chamber has ruled on it, the defense must
make a motion for certification to appeal. Seventh, and finally, that
motion must be granted by the Trial Chamber.
1. Missed Opportunities
Unfortunately, the ICTR jurisprudence is littered with situations
where these elements failed to align. One example is Prosecutor v.
Akayesu. Of the motions filed only one pertained to vagueness in the
indictment. However, when counsel argued before the Chamber, he did
not address the indictment but instead spoke about the conditions of
Akayesu’s detention.120 The Chamber was unable to make any decisions
or determinations addressing Akayesu’s concerns about the indictment
because of this deviation, and limited itself to “taking notice of the
merits” of Akayesu’s complaint.121 Counsel did not raise the issue again
and it remained unaddressed, even if there were valid grounds for
challenging the ambiguity of the indictment.
Another is seen in Prosecutor v. Simba. In that case, Simba
challenged the indictment but the Trial Chamber determined that it was
adequate.122 Simba appealed the decision, but did not follow the proper
procedure: interlocutory appeals concerning jurisdiction are a matter of
right, but all other appeals must be certified by the Trial Chamber.123
Since Simba did not obtain certification from the Trial Chamber, the
Appeals Chamber had no choice but to dismiss the challenge without
considering the merits. 124 Simba challenged the ambiguity of the
indictment a second time, and this time the Trial Chamber agreed that
there was impermissible vagueness and required changes to the
indictment.125 Dissatisfied, Simba appealed the decision but again failed

120. Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Decision on the Preliminary
Motion Submitted by the Defense on the Form of the Indictment and Exclusion of
Evidence, ¶ 2 (Sept. 27, 1996).
121. See id.
122. Prosecutor v. Simba, Case No. ICTR-2001-76-I, Decision on Defence Motion
Alleging Defects in the Form of the Indictment (Jan. 26, 2004).
123. Simba v. Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-01-76-AR72, Decision on Aloys Simba’s
Interlocutory Appeal Regarding Defects in the Form of the Indictment (Mar. 24, 2004).
124. Id.
125. Prosecutor v. Simba, Case No. ICTR-01-76-I, Decision on Preliminary
Defence Motion Regarding Defects in the Form of the Indictment (May 6, 2004).
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to get certification from the Trial Chamber; the appeal was therefore
dismissed without the Appeals Chamber discussing the merits, as
before.126 Still unsatisfied with the indictment, Simba raised a third
challenge; the Trial Chamber gave him a slap on the wrist for his
piecemeal motions and found the indictment to be sufficient.127 Simba
must have remembered his prior failures in the Appeals Chamber
because he decided to change his approach: he appealed on grounds of
jurisdiction, which is an appeal that does not need to be certified by the
Trial Chamber.128 The content of his argument was the same, however:
“the Appellant has attempted to reformulate his arguments in
jurisdictional terms, [but] the Appeals Chamber considers that the
substance of the Appeal remains nonetheless concerned with alleged
defects in the form of the indictment.” 129 The Appeals Chamber
therefore dismissed the appeal without discussing the merits. Simba did
not challenge the indictment again. All of his motions were properly
preliminary, and there may have been merit to his complaints, but
without the proper procedure and arguments the Appeals Chamber would
not weigh in on the issue.
Many other preliminary motions have been filed but have either
failed to run the gamut130 or have failed to be certified for appeal.131
2. Nizeyimana
There has been only one instance where all of these different factors
aligned to reach the Appeals Chamber: Prosecutor v. Nizeyimana.
Nizeyimana challenged the vagueness in the indictment, and he did so
126. Simba v. Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-01-76-AR72.2, Decision on Validity of
Appeal Pursuant to Rule 72(E) of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence (June 4, 2004).
127. Prosecutor v. Simba, Case No. ICTR-01-76-I, Decision on the Defence’s
Preliminary Motion Challenging the Second Amended Indictment (July 14, 2004).
128. Prosecutor v. Simba, Case No. ICTR-01-76AR72.3, Decision on Validity of
Appeal Pursuant to Rule 72(E) of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence (Sept. 30, 2004).
129. Id. ¶ 5.
130. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Renzaho, Case No. ICTR-97-31-I, Decision on
Preliminary Motion on Defects in the Form of the Indictment (Sept. 5, 2006); Prosecutor
v. Mpambara, Case No. ICTR-2001-65-1, Decision on the Defence Preliminary Motion
Challenging the Amended Indictment (May 30, 2005); Prosecutor v. Zigiranyirazo, Case
No. ICTR-2001-73-I, Decision on the Defence Preliminary Motion Objecting to the Form
of the Amended Indictment (July 15, 2004).
131. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Setako, Case No. ICTR-04-81-I, Decision on Defence
Motion for Certification to Appeal the Chamber’s Decision of 3 March 2008 on Defects
in the Indictment (June 17, 2008).
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through a preliminary motion.132 As in many of the other motions, the
Trial Chamber agreed that the indictment was vague and required that
the prosecutor amend particular paragraphs in order to provide more
information.133 The prosecutor failed to amend the indictment with
sufficient particularity; Nizeyimana filed another motion, but the Trial
Chamber ruled that, except for a few minor changes, the prosecutor had
complied with the order and the indictment was sufficient.134
Nizeyimana then filed a motion to certify the decision for appeal.
Nizeyimana argued two points: that the Trial Chamber misinterpreted its
own decision in determining compliance with its orders, and that the
prosecutor still had not complied with the decision.135 In the Trial
Chamber’s treatment of the issue, it pointed out that “[t]he two grounds
of appeal are linked together by the shared complaint of vagueness in the
Indictment” and “[t]he resolution of the first would directly affect the
resolution of the second.”136 It found that specificity in the indictment
would materially affect the outcome of the proceedings, and that an
immediate resolution by the Appeals Chamber would speed up the
proceedings (a trial date had not been set yet and this motion was
standing in the way of the case proceeding).137 The Trial Chamber
therefore certified the appeal and it was sent to the Appeals Chamber.138
In four scant pages the Appeals Chamber dismissed the motion on
the merits because the prosecutor had filed a new indictment and the
issue had become moot.139 It left open the option that Nizeyimana could
challenge the new indictment, but declined to examine the previous one

132. Prosecutor v. Nizeyimana, Case No. ICTR-2000-55-PT, Defence Motion to
Order the Prosecution to Comply with a Trial Chamber Decision (Mar. 18, 2010).
133. Prosecutor v. Nizeyimana, Case No. ICTR-2001-55-PT, Decision on
Nizeyimana’s Preliminary Motion on Defects in the Amended Indictment (June 9, 2010).
134. Prosecutor v. Nizeyimana, Case No. ICTR-2001-55C-PT, Decision on
Nizeyimana’s Motion to Order the Prosecutor to Conform with a Trial Chamber Decision
and Strike Parts of the June 18 Amended Indictment (July 12, 2010).
135. Prosecutor v. Nizeyimana, Case No. ICTR-2000-55-PT, Nizeyimana Defense
Motion for Certification (July 15, 2010).
136. Prosecutor v. Nizeyimana, Case No. ICTR-2001-55C-PT, Decision on
Ildephonse Nizeyimana’s Motion for Certification, ¶ 5 (Aug. 12, 2010).
137. Id. ¶ 7.
138. Id. ¶ 8.
139. Nizeyimana v. Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-00-55-AR73, Decision on
Nizeyimana’s Interlocutory Appeal from the Decision on Nizeyimana’s Motion to Order
the Prosecutor to Conform with a Trial Chamber Decision and Strike Parts of the June 18
Amended Indictment (Oct. 14, 2010).
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because it was no longer operative.140
3. Moving Forward
The lack of jurisprudence, therefore, can be explained by the lack of
opportunity for the Appeals Chamber to legitimately analyze the
sufficiency of pre-trial indictments. It will not make a decision where
none is required, and it will not waste its scarce time on an illuminating
but unnecessary determination of an issue that is no longer relevant.
However, the issue that prompted the appeal still remains: what amount
of specificity is required for a proper indictment? Who decides? What
standard is used?
How the Tribunal deals with challenges to the indictment is partially
determined by the stage of the proceedings during which the challenge
was raised. During trial, proceedings have already started and the
Chamber has an interest in finding ways to satisfy the requirement of
notice without seriously interrupting or delaying the flow of the trial or
making demands on the prosecutor that it cannot actually meet.141 During
appeal, the main concern is whether a respected, fair judgment—one that
can be cited as precedent, will withstand the rigors of examination and
debate, and satisfies the desire to mete out justice and assign
responsibility—was given.142
The same concerns exist pre-trial as during trial, but in a slightly
different way: the Trial Chamber has more of an interest to take the time
and ensure the indictment is sufficient before proceedings start. Thus, the
balance between the rights of the accused and judicial efficiency tips in
favor of the accused. Proceedings have not started and so it is the proper
time to hammer out difficulties in the indictment. However, while the
Trial Chamber is fully invested in protecting the rights of the accused, it
could not allow challenges to the indictment to stretch into perpetuity,
thus preventing the setting of a trial date and delaying the purpose for
which the Tribunal was established. Similarly, there are reasonable limits
to what can be demanded of the prosecutor in terms of specificity.
140. Id. ¶ 8.
141. Hence, the creation of curing. See supra Part II.A.
142. Ntagerura, Bagambiki & Imanishimwe, Case No. ICTR-99-46-A, Judgment, ¶
29 (July 7, 2006) (“When challenges to an indictment are raised on appeal, amendment of
the indictment is no longer possible and so the question is whether the error of trying the
accused on a defective indictment "invalidat[ed] the decision" and warrants the Appeals
Chamber's intervention.”)
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Nonetheless, this difference in focus and concern suggests why the
jurisprudence as it stands is insufficient to determine how a pre-trial
challenge to the indictment should be solved: the underlying concerns
during trial are not present in the same way as before trial.
If such an appeal reached the Appeals Chamber, there are a number
of possibilities for how the Chamber might address the question. It may
rule that the determination of sufficiency is properly within the scope of
the Trial Chamber and refuse to add any new standards or determinations
regarding the issue. It is also possible that the Chamber might weigh the
indictment itself, and determine whether it is defective or not and what
remedies are required (a new indictment, for example, or amendments to
the indictment, similar to the many Trial Chamber decisions mentioned
above).143 It is unlikely, however, that the Chamber would declare a
bright-line rule: all of the jurisprudence so far allows for changing
circumstances (using non-indictment materials to supplement the
indictment and provide notice) and some flexibility in the charging
instrument (different requirements depending on the crime charged).144
Another possibility is that the Chamber may decline to establish any new
standard or rule and apply already-existing standards for specificity (for
example, more precision when the accused is charged with committing
the crimes himself, and less precision when a mass crime is charged).
B.

The ICC: Is this a sustainable path?

When the Pre-Trial Chamber held that it did not need to adjourn to
allow the prosecutor to amend the Document Containing the Charges, it
set a questionable precedent. One of the recurring complaints against the
Pre-Trial Chamber’s decision is that it effectively created a shortcut: if
the Pre-Trial Chamber does not believe the statutorily-required process is
the most efficient use of its time, then it will interpret the statute in such
a way as to not require an adjournment at all.145 It is understandable why
the Chamber would want to expedite the proceedings (or at least ensure

143. See supra Part II.A.
144. The requirement of flexibility is not surprising given the unique situation of
the ICTR. The Tribunal is prosecuting crimes that occurred over sixteen years ago, some
of which are so sweeping that a full collection of the evidence is impossible, and it must
work with the limited number of cases over which it has jurisdiction.
145. See Michela Miraglia, Admissibility of Evidence, Standard of Proof, and
Nature of the Decision in the ICC Confirmation of Charges in Lubanga, 6 J. INT’L CRIM.
JUST. 489, 502-03 (2008).
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they are not delayed), but what about notice?
There is much language in the decision upholding the sanctity of
notice—the Pre-Trial Chamber points to this very concept in its
reasoning behind not adjourning the procedures. It states that the purpose
of the confirmation hearing is to ensure that the charged individual faces
the same crimes as in the Document Containing the Charges and has an
opportunity to rebut the allegations.146 Yet, when the Chamber stated that
there was no material distinction between Article 8(2)(e)(vii) and Article
8(2)(b)(xxvi) and inserted a charge of criminal conduct under the second
statute—without requiring an adjournment for the Document Containing
the Charges—it collapsed part of the notice requirements.147 A charged
individual may now have the charges against him expanded at the
discretion of the Pre-Trial Chamber.148
This move by the Pre-Trial Chamber may not appear problematic at
this stage in the proceedings, but what happens at the end of the trial? At
the ICTR, an individual can only be convicted of charges in the
indictment. This has been one reason, as seen above, why ambiguities
and vagueness in the indictment are so problematic—without this
limitation, an accused may find himself facing a panoply of charges at
the end of the trial that were not presented at the beginning. This wrinkle
has not been clarified at the ICC, either by the Rome Statute or the Rules
on Evidence and Procedure, and so it is up for debate how the ICC Trial
Chamber will deal with this when a verdict must be written. Since
Lubanga was not charged in his Document Containing the Charges under
Article 8(2)(b)(xxvi), under ICTR case law he could not be found guilty
of a violation at the end of his trial—he could only be found guilty for
violating Article 8(2)(e)(vii), which is included in the formal
document.149
How will the Trial Chamber at the ICC handle this difficulty? Will
it hold that the accused may be convicted on charges in the Decision on
the Confirmation of the Charges, rather than restricting it to the charging
instrument itself? If the Pre-Trial Chamber may add charges at its
discretion, without the requisite amendment by the Prosecutor, what is
the purpose of the elaborate scheme for amendments included in the
146. Prosecutor v. Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Decision on the
Confirmation of Charges, ¶ 203 (January 29, 2007).
147. Id. ¶ 204.
148. Id.
149. Muvunyi v. Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-2000-55A-A, Judgment, ¶ 18 (Aug.
29, 2008).
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Rome Statute? Furthermore, this decision may negatively affect defense
strategy. If the defense spent all its time, energy, and resources
combating the charge of enlistment in an international conflict, it is
questionable whether it has been able to present a proper defense if the
accused can only be convicted for enlistment in an internal conflict. Will
the defense be forced to choose between strategies, possibly sacrificing
one exonerating strategy and taking a risk on another? These questions
may take the current situation to an extreme, but they illustrate the
problematic realities for notice.
On the other hand, given the fact that the hearing is not ex parte, are
concerns about notice as troublesome? As stated above, one of the main
evils that the requirement of notice protects against is a defendant going
to trial without knowing the charges he is facing. Conversely, notice
limits the charges that can be brought against him after the trial has run
its course. In this case, Lubanga was present during the entirety of the
confirmation hearing. He heard all of the evidence that the prosecutor
submitted, heard all of the arguments raised, and was given an
opportunity to rebut the same with evidence and legal arguments.150
Going forward, he has a copy of the confirmation of charges, he has all
of the evidence,151 and as a result he is perfectly aware that he is on trial
for conscripting child soldiers to participate in both an international and
internal armed conflict. His ability to mount a defense, one could argue,
has therefore not been materially affected in any way. This suggests that
the ICC’s shortcut in the confirmation hearing might not have such dire
consequences as forecast above, at least for requirements of notice. Yet
this does not quite comport with the firm commitment that the ICC has
made to protect the rights of the accused. If the Pre-Trial Chamber takes
a shortcut, albeit a transparent shortcut that each party is aware of, is it
not still a shortcut?
Conclusion
Thus, while the problems that the ICTR and the ICC face are
distinct, they nevertheless implicate the same concerns of notice. The

150. See Miraglia, supra note 145, at 502. This was partially the basis upon which
the PTC denied appellate review of this issue. It held that both sides had been able to
adequately litigate the issue. Id.
151. Mazurek, supra note 9, at 540 (“The defense has access to the entire
investigation dossier which contains both inculpatory and exculpatory evidence.”).
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ICTR has created clear jurisprudence correcting an insufficient
indictment after the trial has already started, but has yet to determine
what a sufficient indictment looks like when challenged during the pretrial stage. Yet the pre-trial stage is the crucial time to challenge the
indictment, and this lack of jurisprudence imposes on the rights of the
accused. The ICC, even though it has just begun creating its
jurisprudence, has already manufactured a grey area that it must resolve
before the end of Lubanga’s trial. Despite the fact that the confirmation
hearing is not an ex parte hearing, the Pre-Trial Chamber has infringed
upon the charged individual’s right to notice without any discernable
benefit or reason.
Given the aggressive trend towards protecting the rights of the
accused, there are likely to be decisions from the Appeals Chamber and
the ICC that fill in the grey areas. There is rumor that Nizeyimana is
challenging the new, amended indictment on similar grounds, and
therefore it is possible that the issue will reach the Appeals Chamber
again. Yet Nizeyimana’s trial has started, and thus the window of
opportunity for determining pre-trial sufficiency has closed. Similarly,
the ICC cannot complete Lubanga’s trial without addressing the problem
it started at the confirmation hearing, and therefore is likely to discuss
the issue as the trial proceeds. As the Tribunals continue to move
forward, however, one thing is certain: their commitment to notice, and
the desire to protect rights and adjudicate a fair trial, will not waver.
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